SECOND DIVISION
FIRST WOMEN’S CREDIT G.R. No. 169026
CORPORATION and SHIG
KATAYAMA,
Petitioners,
Present:
PUNO,
J., Chairperson,
- v e r s u s - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA,
JJ.
HON. HERNANDO B. PEREZ,
in his capacity as the
SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
RAMON P. JACINTO,
JAIME
C. COLAYCO, ANTONIO P.
TAYAO, and GLICERIO PEREZ,
Respondents. Promulgated:
June
15, 2006
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R E S O L U T I O N
CORONA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for
review[1]
of the March 10, 2005 decision and July 11, 2005 resolution of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 74145.[2]
This case began with a complaint-affidavit[3]
filed in the City Prosecutor’s Office of Makati by petitioner Shig Katayama, a
stockholder and director of petitioner First Women’s Credit Corporation (FWCC),
accusing private respondents Ramon P. Jacinto, Jaime C. Colayco, Antonio P.
Tayao and Glicerio Perez of resistance and disobedience to persons in
authority, unlawful use of means of publications and unlawful utterances,
falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents, and
estafa.
At the conclusion of the preliminary
investigation, the investigating prosecutor issued a resolution[4]
finding probable cause to prosecute private respondents for falsification of
private documents and grave coercion.
Private respondents appealed the
investigating prosecutor’s resolution to public respondent Secretary of
Justice. In a resolution dated April 29, 2002,[5]
public respondent ruled that there was no probable cause to prosecute private respondents
for falsification of private documents and grave coercion. Accordingly, public
respondent directed the City Prosecutor of Makati City to move for the
withdrawal of the informations which had in the meantime been filed against
private respondents in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City. In a
subsequent resolution dated September 24, 2002,[6]
public respondent denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners thereafter filed a
petition for certiorari[7]
in the CA to annul public respondent’s adverse resolutions for having been
rendered with grave abuse of discretion.
It was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74145.
In a decision dated March 10, 2005,[8]
the CA held that public respondent committed no grave abuse of discretion in
ruling against the existence of probable cause to prosecute private
respondents. The petition was therefore dismissed for lack of merit and the
Secretary of Justice’s resolutions affirmed in toto. In a subsequent resolution dated July 11,
2005,[9]
the CA denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners would have us give due
course to their petition, reverse and set aside the CA decision and resolution,
and annul the resolutions of the Secretary of Justice. But this is easier said than done.
As stated correctly by the CA, the
determination of probable cause for the filing of an information in court is an
executive function,[10]
one that properly pertains at the first instance to the public prosecutor and,
ultimately, to the Secretary of Justice.[11] For this reason, the Court considers it sound
judicial policy to refrain from interfering in the conduct of preliminary
investigations and to leave the Department of Justice ample latitude of
discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to
establish probable cause for the prosecution of supposed offenders.[12] Consistent with this policy, courts do not
reverse the Secretary of Justice’s findings and conclusions on the matter of
probable cause except in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion.[13] Thus, petitioners will prevail only if they can
show that the CA erred in not holding that public respondent’s resolutions were
tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment which is equivalent to an excess or lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility.[14]
Viewed against the foregoing
standards, public respondent’s resolution to direct the withdrawal of the
informations against private respondents does not appear to have been made with
grave abuse of discretion. The reasons
for the course of action taken by public respondent were stated clearly and
sufficiently in the assailed resolution of April 29, 2002.[15]
There was no hint of whimsicality, no
gross and patent abuse of discretion as would amount to “an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act
at all in contemplation of law.” Quite
to the contrary, public respondent resolved the issues by applying basic precepts
of criminal law to the facts, allegations, and evidence on record.
Even on the assumption that public
respondent did make some erroneous inferences of fact and conclusions of law
along the way, the CA could not have corrected these errors on certiorari as
these were not of a degree that would amount to a clear case of abuse of
discretion of the grave and malevolent kind.[16] Thus, in Estrada v. Desierto,[17]
this Court held that the public respondents in said case did not gravely abuse
their discretion in dismissing a criminal complaint even though their
interpretation of the applicable law and jurisprudence might well have been
wrong.[18] After all, it is elementary that not every
erroneous conclusion of law or fact is an abuse of discretion.[19]
At any rate, petitioners’ arguments
before the CA[20]
could be reduced to the allegation that public respondent erred in appreciating
the evidence presented. This being the
case, we cannot fault the CA for not reversing public respondent’s resolutions
for it has long been the rule that errors in the appreciation of evidence may
not be reviewed in a petition for certiorari as they do not involve any
jurisdictional question.[21]
There being no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of public respondent, we hold that the CA committed no reversible
error in dismissing the petition.
Wherefore, the petition is DENIED. The decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74145 are hereby affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Associate Justice
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above resolution had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
Chief Justice
[1] Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Aurora Santiago-Lagman and concurred in by Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Rebecca De Guia-Salvador of the Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals. Rollo, pp. 50-62.
[3] Docketed as I.S. No. 00-401106-53.
[4] Dated September 4, 2001. Rollo, pp. 200-204.
[5] Id., pp. 242-247.
[6] Id., pp. 269-270.
[7] Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
[8] Rollo, pp. 50-62.
[9] Id., pp. 64-65.
[10] Hegerty v. Court of Appeals, 456 Phil. 542, 549 (2003).
[11] Punzalan
v. Dela Peña, G.R. No. 158543, 21 July 2004, 434 SCRA 601, 610.
[12] Id. at 611.
[13] See Joaquin, Jr. v. Drilon, 361 Phil. 900, 908 (1999).
[14] Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. No. 156160, 9 December 2004, 445 SCRA 655, 668.
[15] Rollo, pp. 246-247.
[16] Supra note 14 at 674.
[17] G.R. No. 156160, 9 December 2004, 445 SCRA 655.
[18] Id., pp. 673-674.
[19] Id., p. 674.
[20] Rollo, pp. 280-289.
[21] Day v. RTC of Zamboanga City, G.R. No. 79119, 22 November 1990, 191 SCRA 610, 619; Abig v. Constantino, 112 Phil. 236, 243 (1961).